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" ln

order to conquer the world we must first
conquer China . . . With all the resources of
Chino at our disposal we shall pass forward to thp
conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor,
Central Asia and even Europe."
l'kp

la$mese Premik r .

JAPANESE

IMPERIALISM
STRIPPED

(Concerning the Tanaka Memorandum).
M o w the memorandum handed to the J a p e s e
Emperor on July 25, 1927, by the Japanese Prime Minis&,
M. Tanaka. All the workers of the world who stand in
defence of the Soviet Union s h u l d know this h u m e a t .
The
workers and peasants of thc calonies and semi-roloaies should
know it. In particular the workers and peasants of China, Momgolia, Manchuria and Korea &odd be acquaintad with if.
W e are seldom given the opportunity of examining the most
secret, intimate documents of imperialists heading the Govemment of a "Great Powers'--documents in whicb the Government
throws off its mask and with suave candour lays all the rapacious
programme and methods of action of its Govetnment before the
head of the State.
The document is interesting because it gives us the key to an
understanding of all that is gang on at present on the Manchurian
plains aad gives authoritative confirnation of how near is intervention against the Soviet Union.
I t is interesting in that it
shows up the unbounded, militarist plans of rapahus Japanese
imperiaIisrn which is threatening us with a new world imperialist
war. The dmument is interesting beeause it gives a shamefully
bare-faced description of all the methods of bloody violence,
robbery, oppression, lies, deceit and cunning used by impridism
to gain its own ends. It is interesting, again, because it shows
how the imperialists are prepared now to rob wen those whom
they had, m the beginning, deceived into being the catspaw for
carrying out their offensive, those whom they look upon as the
"vanguard" of this offensive (in the present case-the Koreans).
Finally, the document is interesting in that it wholeheartedly
dedareqthat all this policy which it describes itseIf as a policy of
violence, robbery and deceit has as its aim the "conso1idation of
our national defence in the interests of peace and order in the
Far East" 1 ! (page 16).
Jn what way does Japanese imperialism, in accordance with this
memorandum, intend to act "in the interests of peace and order
in the Far East"?
As regards the U.S.S.R., Japan's "peace policy" is thc
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"If the Chinese-Eastern Railway belonging to Soviet Russia
develops in this district, then our new continental policy will
receive a blow which will inevitably bring about conflict with
Soviet Russia in the near future. In this case we shall again be
obliged to play the rdle ws played in the Rwso-Japanese War.
, The Chinese-Eastem Railway d l become ours just as the
South6m-Manchurian railmy became ours, and we shall seize
3

-

Kirin a8 we seized Dairen. It seems that the iilwitabiity of
crossing swords with Russis on the fields of Mongolia in order
to gain possession of the Walth of North Manchuria is part of
our programme of national development" @ e 18). "If we
I d into the future we must admit the i~zsvitabily of mar with
Russia on the fields of North Manchu&'' (page 19). "Having
constructed this line, we can convert Dala~into a base for the
ofFensive against Siberia dong three roads: through Tu-,
Andan and Tsitsikar. The nches of North Manchuria will fall
into our hands" ( p a p ao): "Manchuria and Mongolia,
Eastern countries wh~chare at111 absolutely undeveloped. Sooner or later we shall have to fight here against Soviet Russia. The
fight will take phee in Girin" (page as).
In these statements it is interesting to note that Japanese impWsm compares the mming war against the rwolutipnary
Soviet Rqublim, which day by day graw stronger and stronger,
with tbe last war against the Twist monarchy which was entirely
rotten to the core. The Japanese imperialists have already tried
the feebleness of the weapons of the Tsarisr army, which shed its
b l d in Manchurh, on foreign territory for the sake of the
rapacious aim8 of Tsarism ;but t h y have not yet experienced the
force of arms of the Red Army which, standig by the policy of
the Soviet Government, will not 6ght for purposes d conquest but
which, should Japanese hordes invade the remto of the Soviet
Union, will stoutly defend the Iaad, without yid 'ng an inch of
-ground, The fact that the Japnese do not understand the
fundamental difference between the Tsarist Army and the Red
Army will, of course, only increase their determination to mala
inteweotioo
As regards the United States of America, Japanese imperialism
describes its "policy of pace" in the memorandum as follows :" I n the infr7ests of s s l f - c b f ~ and
e the &few%af o t k s ( I)
Japan cannot remove the di&uIties in Eastern Asia, witbout
pursuing a polic of 'blood and iron.' But in pursuing this
policy we shall
brought up face. to face with the United
States, who are directed towards us by the Chinew @icy d
3ghthg again& poison with the help of poison. If we wish,
in future, to gain control wer Cbina, we must m k tb United
States, i.e., befaat18tomardo the Stated as ~ l n rdid duAng the
Russo-Japanese Was. In order to conquer Cbina, we must first
conquer Manchuria and Mongolia" (page r I ) .
Here, again, Japanese imperialism, under the hypnosis of
Japan's dd victory over the Tsarist Army, compares the futiue
m r against the United States with the old Russo-Japanese war.
And this illusion only increases the reality of the future war
between Japan and the United States.
Therefore the strategic plan of Japanese imperialism amounts
b this : First, seize Manchuria and Mongolia and make'interven-
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ordermtheFar EasL"

. .&quer
. W e the
waiting to see haw Japaneseimperlahn will in the f u m
whole of Asia and "men Europe," we might £or
.

4 m e being note the fact as to how Japanese . i m p c r i a ~in x.gw
ieteaded to act in I 31 fwd haw it h s begun to act M y ) in
Chiaa, Mancburh, i fongoPa and Korea In this respect W
memomdurn is particularly Interethg. If as regads future
s
t
s the au@er J the memorandum sari be called a daydreaming, imperial'i Dm Quixote, when the question conems
uar pefspemws connectad with the a h r e of Manchuria and
Mongolia and the war against the U.S,S.&, he gives a well
&ought out, caaerete* militiy and strategi*
a~~samic
and
af attark, which Japan bas already begun ta put
As regards China, Jupaimperialism s b w a the same aomabsence of any understanding of, an8
compWy
pores, the forces of rwolurion, as m s the c u e itl the attitude

pet^

tuwards the U.S. S.R. The meanorandurn was dram up In r 7,
is+ whe. the wave ad rewlution had already swept tha SouCof
,aka. ~ e m r t h e i e s s memoriaad- refer= to the awakening
af China ,mlg as a
'Wgq. Evt we are sot at .tthem*
' irrtcrested in tlre b
W o o n d b . d the iPlperklist, but in the q e
tign as.tQ haw these impdalbt ",uvilisarsp'b h v e towards the
d m n g peoples. The memorarrdum runs thus:-

order to be able on the
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rnent intended exclusively

for the Japanese Emperor, expIaintd

how Japanese imperialism intends defending their "independence. "
"Manchuria and Mongolia are the '~el~iums* the Far

if

East. During the Great War Belgium was made the battlefield. fn our -7s with Rwsk and the United States, me must
insist u p a ~
Manchuriq and Moagolia bearing all: the horrors of
mar. As it is clear that we shall have to violate the neutrality
of thew territor5es, we must at alI cosu construct the GinnHoiren and the Chan-Chun-Dalai milways . , '' (page 23).
The memorandum, however, is not limited to the sutement that
Japanex imperialism will be wmpelled to violate the neutrality
of Mongolia and Manchuria and corn* them to "experience all
the horrors of war." I t describes wrth shameless sincerity how
Japanese imperiaIisrn having gained control of Mongolia, will rob
its toiIin masses :" d m there will be enough of mr people in inner and Outer
Mongolia, 108 shall buy up the land, paying for it om-tenth
. purf of its tmr value, and begin to grow rice there in'order to
increase our s t w k of fm&t&s.
When w have a hrp8
section of the- lad in our hands, thsrd i l l no Iongev be any
question us to whslk~rMongolia belongs to the apaness or to
the Mongolians. Backed up by our military ores, we can
rearise our pvsitit~e( I) policy. In order to achieve this plan,
one million yens must be assigned from the 'secret fund of the
war ministry' and 400 retired officers must be sent to Inner and
Outer Monmlia. These offie8~s,dressed as Chinese &%ens and
adkg as fsachsrs, mwt Ejvr among the p + h t i o n and ggn
the conwencs of the Mmgolbro princes a d so on" (page r5).
Japanese imperialism not only intended, and is int&&g, -to
rob the Mongolians by deceiving them.
Japamese imperialism
uses the same tactic of deceit and oonsequent robbery towards the
Koreanfi, whom it wishes to use as its catspaw for military purposes in China :"As a result of the freedom which they (the Koreans) enjoy
in Manchuria, thanks to the imperfect police system (apparently
perfection is not compatible with freedom according to the
imperialists.-Ed.), and also owing to the wealth of the land,
no fewer than one mllion Koreans are to be found in the three
'
Eastern provinces,
They cmmt be compared with the
. naturalised Japanese in California, and South America. They
have merely become Chinese temporarily. When their number
reaches two-and-a-half millions and more, it wiU be possBl&to
incite them, in case of rrscessity, to military actwn atrd ws
s h d support them, aswritng ihem that m are su#+~essing the
Korean movment" (page ~ 5 ) .
This is similar to what the English are doing in f n d i , Persk
land Afghanistan, ete., to what France is domg in her colonies,
and the U.S.A. in Latin Amerim I The memorandum furthe
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mne~aeoa,the Japanese imperialist Tmaka offers unbounded
P

~ ~ = *
"In inviting other Powers to take part in the development
d the South Manchurian Railway, we am deceive the urhaIe
w l d ( !1). Having done this we can move forward into Manchuria and Mongolia, etc" (page 3x1.
Tbis gives one nn idea of the imperialit "civilisers," when
they bare and rumask themselves before their chief, behind the
wcLncs.
'I'hr Tanaka

memorandum is of enormous interest and should
be given wide circulation among the proletarians and peasants of
the whole world ; not only because it is of actual sign%cance now,
being an , undisputed codmation of the fact that Japanesa
imperialism is making direct prepmtions for intwvention against
ttie. U.S.S.R. and against the Chinese revolution, but because it
throws P strong light upon the basis of imperialist policy as a
whole. The Tanaka memorandum is a true text-book d imperialism. The rapacious ends served and the cunning means used,
according to the Tanaka memorandum by Japanese imperialism,
are curnmon to tbe imperialism of dl the "Great Powers." Whm
we are given the opportunity of reading the secret memoranda
ot any Prime Minister to his King, or to the President of the
Republic, we may be sure that they will be as alike as two peas
to the Taaaka memorandum. The proletariat of every capitalist
country should rheiefore learn the nature of their ollm national
imperialism from the example of the Tanaka memorandum until
such time as they, having achieved tbeir own October, will
be able to read the memoranda of their own late Ministers in their
own Soviet State archives. But this memorandum must be read
by the prol4tatiat of all countries not only for the purpose of
studying the nature of imperklimt. It should muse them u to
basten on the moment when the whole system of violence, rob ery
and deceit which i s called impddism, dull be swept away.

E

MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITIVE POLICY IN MANCHURIA, PRESENTBD TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN ON
JULY as, rga7, BY THE PRIME MINISTER, M. TAMAKA.
Since the European war Japanese political and economic
interests have been in an irregular state. Tbis is due to the fact
that we were not able to make use of our special privifeges in
Manchuriu and Mongolia and entiitfly realise the righrs we had
gained. When I was appointed Prime Minister, I was particularly instructed to defend our interests in this sphere and to lose
no opportunities for further expansion. Tasks of this sort cannot
be considered IightIy. Since I, in my capacity of a simple citizen,
have been in favour of a positive policy ia regard to Manchuria
and Mongolia, I have been c o n s ~ t l yeodemrvaddg to put this

W B L B .

'

Mambuia and Mmgolia include the Fengiieb, Kitin aad Rd
Lwng-kbg provinces aad h e r and Outer Mongolk The ;#bole
covers 7+=
sqwtre miles with a ppalatim of
of this
m i l l h . This territory is awr three tima as hrge as that d our
own Empire without Korea and Formosa, altbugh'the papub
&XI
is t h e times d l w than ours. The counw is an attru&on
lmot only -use
of the sparsity of the pqmIatioa :nowhere in the
world can .there be fomd such rlctr fomsts, such a wealth d
mineral resaurocs and agrhltnd prodarch T h d South 84chub Rdvpy QQmwp was specidly created for the purpose
of Moithg these riches and m w s i n g our national glorp.
h r d b g to p b which should be equally advantagerpus b t h
for a i m and for Japaa, we bested no 1- thrrn 440 d i u n yens
ia ous. dmysI epping, forestry, steal, agricultural and cattleb t Q e d i uadertalrings.
This, d & u t doubt, is our b i g p ~
besment and strongest mgdsation. klthwgh tbis u d m t k fng b nominally in tdte callectivc posseslorn of the Eolr4rarseatand
t h e m ,d
y it L e a ~ y i n t h s ~ d s theWvemmen1
of
h so far U S the South Manchuria Raiiway Company is e q m w e d
with diplomatic, police md ordinary admhistrative f m d o m ~fat
thc purpose of pu*
tbrotlgb our imperial policy, it is a 5 p d d
orgarhion which h exactly tbe same rights as the Koran
G a v e m b ~ ~ d
fact dona @
s
af the enormous
whkh we tyive in ~
~ and uMa+ & The pn@
being pimud t ~ m t d sthis tountry has k e n pursued skce the
t h e of Em-r
Medji, om the W s d his btrwtbm and is
bkging b u t the devthpmmt of oi new c~ntheutdEm*
whiGh is WWWfor the further devebpmeat of mu wdod
glory and the prosperitp d innumerable future generatiUnfommateiy, s h e the Europeaa war thtm have ken m-t
changes in home and foreign
The powers of the thtae
Eustern pmvhes hve alsd
alert and, fo-sg.
,om example, are making &orb3 at remnstru&on and indusdevelopment. Wa have to admit &at there have been astpundkg
sucmwes which haw most seriously hindered the p W h , d ow
h p h d us in an UaEaveblcposi-md
fdm.
w t i a t b s with the, cnnsbntry c h @ g Gwcmmmb of Idam-.
&urh and .Mongolia have been ~u~~
h d r * Sb, ; ,

'

Nine Powers Agwement, signed at the Washington Conference,
limited our specid rigbts and privileges, to such an extent that
we lost all freedom there. Our country's very existence is
threatened.
If these obstacles are not removed, there will, be no safeguard
for our national existence, and our national power will not develop.
Moreover, sources of wealth are concentrated in Nortb Manchuria.
If we are going to have no right to penetrate into Northern Manchuria, it is dear that we cannot lay hands upon the wealth of that
country.
Even the resources of South Manchuria, which we
gained during thc Russo-Japanese war, are severel limited by
the agreement of the Nine Powers, As a result, w d our people
wnnot f d y settle in Manchuria,' the Chinese are settling there
in huge numbers. Hordes of Chinese arrive each year in the three
Eastera provinces and they number millions, They so menace
our rights in Manchuria and Mongalia, that our annual surplus
population which is w e r &o,ooo persons can 6nd no refuge far
themselves there. In view of this we have to conless our failure
in the attempts made to establish equilibrium between the size of
our population and our fmd supplies. If steps are not taken to
stop the influx of Chinese immediately, their number at the end
of five years will exceed six mution and we shall then be faced with
much bigger difficulties, in M d u r i a and Mongolia.
It must be borne in mind that when the Nine Powers A
p
ment was signed, which limited our freedom of movement in Manchuria and Mongolia, public opinion was seriously disturbed. The
late Emperor Taischo called a conference at which Yamagata and
other high officials of the army and the fleet were present, to
discuss ways and means of fighting against this new obligation.
I was sent to Europe and America unofficially to obtain information concerning the attitude of important smhsrnen on this que*
tion. They dl considered that the agreement between the Great
Powers was concluded upon t L initiagve of the United States of
America. The other Powers who signed the agreement h
cl
nothing against the grawth af our influence in Manchuria and
Mongolia, provided we remain in a position to defend our interests
in international trade and international Investments. Declarations
to this effect were made to me privately by plitical leaders in
England, Fmce and Italy, Unfortunately, just as we were about
to put through our policy and, with the consent: of those whom I
had interviewed during my journey, to declare the Nine Powers
Agreement invalid, the Seiyukan Cabinet suddenly came to an end,
and our policy could not be put though. W e regret this very
strongly. Having exchanged opinions with the Powers about the
develo ment of Manchuria and Mongolia, I t r a v W back through
Shang ai. In Shanghai a Chinaman made an attempt upan my
life. An American woman was wounded, but I, tbmks to the
providential assistance extended to me by the spirits of my dead

E

*

Em-,
was saved. I t is obvious that sacred Providence wishes
me lo help Your Imperial Majesty to open up a new era in the Far
East and to develop our continental Empire.

The three Eastern provinces in the political sense are an imp*
fect stain upon the Far East. In the interests of self-defence md
the defence of others, Japan c m a o t remove the dilExlties in.
Eastern Asia, without pursuing a policy of "blood and iron." But
in pursuing t h ~ spolicy we shall be brougbt up face to face with
the United States, who are directed towards us by the Cbinese
policy of fighting against poison with the help of poison. If we
wish, in future, to gain control over China, we must crush the
United States, i.e., behave towards the United States as we
did during' the Russo-Japanese war.
I n order to wnquef
China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia.
In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. Lf
we are able to conquer China, all the other Asiatic countries and
the countries of the South Seas wit1 fear us and capitulate before
us. The world will then understand that Eastern Asia is ours,
and w01 not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan entrusted
to us by Emperor Medji, and its success is of substantial significance for our national existence.
The Nine Powers Agreement is exclusively the d e c t i w of the
spirit of trade 14vaIry. England and America mated,
means
of their great wealth, to smash our influence in Chins. ?'he proposal for the limitation of armaments is merely a means of curtailIng our military power and depriving us of the
~onqueringthe huge territory of China. On the o~:"Ez
wealth of China wilI be in their hands, exdusively. This agreement is a plan by means of which England and America wisb to
smash our plans. The Minseito Governmege made a great affair
of this Nine Powers Agreement, and empbasised our trade rather
than our rights in China. Tbis policy is incorrect: it is a policy
OF national suicide. England can allow herself the Iuxury of
talking about trade only because she has India and Australia,
which supply her with foodstuffs and other goods.
Tbe same
refers to America, for South America and Canada satisfy her
requirements. Their energies can be wholly devoted to the development of trade in China for the purpose of enriching thtmselves.
But the reserves of fodstuffs and raw materials in Japan are
k o r n i n g less and kss as her population, increases. I If we put all
our hopes u p the development of trade, we may be smashed bj
England and Amerih, with their invincible capitalist might. Ir
the end we get nothing at all. A more dangerous factor is the hci
that the Chinese people may wake up one fine day. Even now,
in these days of internal confusion, they can peacefully toit and
try to mimic us and displace'our goods, thus hindering the dqvehp
went of our trade. Wben we remember that the Chinese are our
oniy purchasers, we must fear the day when China unites and her
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industry begins to flourish. Americans and Europeans will compete with us, and our trade with China will be smashed,, The
proposaI of Minseito to leave the Nine Powers Agreement in force
and pursue a trading policy towards Manchuria is nothing but a

policy of suicide.
Having studied the existing,conditions and possibilities inside
our country, we have to confess that our best policy amounts te
taking positive measures for the purpose of safeguadiog our
rights and privilcgm in Manchuria and Mongolia.
They will
make it possible for us to develop our trade. This will not onIy
hdd back the industrial development of China itself, but will disallow the penetration of European Powers into China. This i s
the only sane policy, the best policy.
In order to win ma1 rights in Manchuria and Mongolia, we
must use this district as a base, and penetrate into the rest of
China under the pretext of dweIoping our trade, Armed with
already safeguarded rights, we &all seize the resources of thc
entire Land. With a11 the resources of China at our disposal, we
shall pass forward to the conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia
Minor, Central Asia and even Europe. But the first step mu&
be the seimrc of control over Manchuria and Moa~olia, if
the Yamatr, race wishes to surpass itself in cuntinental Asta. The
final victory will fall to that country which has sufficient f d
stores. Indusrrial praspority is possible only in countries which
are secure from thc point of view of foodstuft's and raw materials;
the full development of national power is possible only in a State
which exte~~ds
over an enormous territory. If we pursue a positive
policy, extending our rights in Manchuria and in China, all these
conditions so essential to a mighty nadm will cease to k problems. Moreover, our surplus population will be provided for,
amounting as it does to 70o,0o0 annually. If we wish to begin a
new policy and guarantee the permanent welfare of our Empire,
we must pursue a positive policy towards Manchuria and
Mongolia.
MANCHURIA A??DMONGOLIA ARtf NOT CHINESE TERRITORY.

Prom the historical point of view Manchuria and Mongolia are
not Chinese territory or Chinese possessions. Dr. Yano has made
a fundamental study of Chinese history and has come to tbe eonclusion that Manchuria and Mongolia were never Chinese territory.
This fact has been made pubtic to the world by the authritative
representative of the Imperial University. The investigations of
Dr. Yano are so meticulous that there can be found no professor
in China who disputes them. Nevertheless it is a most unfortunate
circumstance that in declaring war upon Russia our Government
openly recopisad the sovereignty of China over all other countries
and repeated the same thing at the Washington Conference, when
we signed the Nine Powers Agreement, As a result of these two

mistakes of ours, the sovereignty of China in Manchuria and
Mongolia is now established in diplomatic relatinns, and our
interests consequently sufier. Although China talks about the
Five Races Republic, nevertheless Tibet, Sintsiang, Mongolia and
Manchuria were always in the pad special districts, and the
princes bad their own customs rights. In actual fact, therefore,
the princes held the sovereign rights, We must explain the true
state of affairs to the world at the first opportunity. W e should
also have penetrated into Inner and Outer Mongolia in order to
reform the country. While the princes carry on their former
adrninistrativc functions there, mereign rights are in their hands.
If we wish to penetrate into these territories, wc must look upon
them as the rulers and negotiate with them concerning rights and
privileges. We shall have a fine opportunity and our national
influence wili rapidly grow.
W R POSITIVE POLICY W MMCHURIA.

As for rights in Manchuria, we must take decisive steps on the
basis of our twentysne demands and attain the foliowing in order
to safeguard the rights we have won :(I) W h e n the agreement concerning trade leases expiies in 1931,
we must obtain the opportunity of extending the period as
we wish. Further, our right to Iease land for commercial,

industrial and agricultural purposes must l
x mgnised.
Japanese citizens must have the right to travel through, and
live in, the Eastern part 01 blongolia and engage in trade
and industrial occupations there. China must free tbem
from subjection to the Chinese law. They must not I
x liable
to illegal taxation and illegal interrogation.
(3) We must have the right to exploit nineteen coal and iron
works in Fengtien and Kirin, and also the right to exploit
the rich forests.
(4) W e must have the first rights in connection with the wnstmction of railways and the placing of Ioaas for this
purpose in S u t h Manchuria and East Mongolia.
(5) The number of Japanese political, financial and military
advisers must be increased, W e must have the first right
to give our own advisers.
(6) W e must have the right to organise police stations for the
defence of Koreans in China.
(7) T h e term of direction and development of the Kirin-Chanchung railway must be extended to 99 ymrs.
(8) We must have the exclusive right to sell spechl goods, and
the first right to support marine traffc from Europe and

(2)

America.
(9) W e must be given the excIusive right to work up the
mineral sources in Hei Lung-kiang.
(10) W c must k given the right to build the K i r i n - H o * ~and

Tsen-Tsin-Dalai railways.

JS

Should money k required to buy up the Chinese-Eastern
Railway, the Japanese Government h u l d be given tbe Erst
right to offera loan to China.
( 1 2 ) We must be given specid rights in the Andun and Inkow
ports and the right of transit transportation a c m ~these
harhurs.
(13) W e must bc -partners
of the Central Bank of the three
Eastern provinces.
frq) W e must have the right of exploitation and of pasturage.
(11)

THIi W S l T I V E WLICY TQWARDS INNER A N D OUTER MONGOLU.

Since Manchuria and Mongolia ate still in the hands of the
native princes, we must in future recogtlise them as the rulers of
these lands and offer tbern support. Guided by this consideration,
the daughter af the Kwantun Governor-General, Fukushia,
risked her life by living among the barbarian Mongolianrpulation in Tuschitu, where she fulfilled the r81e of adviser to e local
prince and thus served the Imperial Government. Since the niece
of the Manchurian prince, Su, bemme the wife of the governing
prince, the relations between the Government and the Mongolian
princes have become considerably closer. All the princes of l ~ e r
and Outer Mongolia hold us in great respect, especially since we
encourage them with special gifts and protection. There are at
present nineteen retired Japanese officers in Tuschitu Wt have
already obtained h e monopoly of the purchase of wool, and the
exploitation of mining resources there. We shall send secretly
a still larger number of retired officers. They must be dressed as
Chinamen, in order not to draw the attention of the Mukden
Government. Scattered in various places, they may engage in
agriculturr, cattle-breeding and the trading of wool.
We can
behave towards other princes just as we behaved to the prince in
Tuschitu. We must have our retired officers everywhere, in
order to gain the control of the princes. When there will be
enough of our people in Inner and Outer Mongolia, we $ball buy
up the Imd, paying for it one-tenth of its true value, and kgin
to grow rice there in order to inerase our stock of foodstuffs.
Where the land is not suitable for the production of rice, we can
engage in cattle-breeding and breed horses, which would be very
important in the military sense. In other places we can engage
in the canning industry and export our goods to Europe and
America, We shall alsu gain much by developing the fur arrd
teather industry.
Finally, Inner and Outcr Mongolia will fall
entirely into our hands. Since the question of sovereign rights
is not sufficiently dear here, and the Chinese and Soviet Governments are engaged on other aEairs, we can peacefully extend our
influence. When we have a large section of the land in our hands,
there will be no longer any question as to whether Mrmgolh
belongs to the Japanese or to the Mongolians. Backed up by our

military forces, we can rdise our positive policy. In order U
a c b i i e this plan, one million yen must be assigned from &e
'f secret fund of the War Ministry" and 400 r e t i d office= muat
be sent to inner and Outer Mongolia. These officers dressed ar
Chinese citizens and acting as teachers, must live among tbe
population and gain the confidence of the Mongolian primes,
obtain from them the right to engage in cattle-breeding aud
mining, and thus lay the foundations of our national interests for
the coming hundred years.
IN SUPPORT

AND DEFENCE OF KOREAN MMIGRA'TlON.

Sincx we annexed Korea, we have had very littIe trouble t b m .
However, the dcclaratiun of President Wilson concerning the selfdetermination of races, made after the European war, played the
d i e of a sacred revelation to the oppressed nations. The Koreans
were no exception and the spirit of dissatisfaction sprertd through-

As a resuk of the freedom which they enjoy in
Manchuria, thanks to the imperfect police system, and also owing
to the wealth of the land, no less than one million Koreans are to
be found in the three Eastern provinces. This development is .
extremely advantageous for us, and has considerably raised our
influence from the economic and military point of view. On the
other hand, this gives us fresh hopes in the sphere of administration far the Koreans, They will be our vanguard in the coloniststion of untouched lands and wiI1 be the link which binds us with
the Chinem people. On the one hand, we wouId be able to makt
use of the aaturalised Koreans for the purpose of purchasing lands
for growing rice, oa the other hand, we could give them financial
assistance through our co-operative societies, of the South Manchuria railways and so on, and thus we should be able to use them
first of all for our economic penetration. Tbis would mitigate our
position in connection with foodstuffs and at the same time open
up new possibiIities of colanisation. Koreans who become
Chinese subjects are only Chinese formdy and they will probably
return to us. They cannot be cumpared with the naturalid
Japanese in California and South America. They have merely
become Chinese temporarily. When their number reaches twoand-a-half million ,and more, it will be possible to incite them, In
case of nwessity, to military action, and we shall support them,
assuring them that we are suppressing the Korcsn movement.
Since not all the Koreans have become Cbinese subjects, in oihet
muntries it will not be known who actualfy brought about tbt
disorderdhinese or Japanese Koreans. We shall always bt
able to mislead world pubkc opinion.
Since it is possible for us to use the Koreans for this purpose,
we must take measures to ensure that the Chinese do not use them
against us. But Manchuria is as much under our jurisdiction as
it is under Chinese. If the Chinese try to make use of the Ko~eaas
out the land.

for war against us, we shall have an excuse for making war upon
China. In that case Soviet Russia would be the most dangerous
factor. If the Chinese use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans,
then the outlook of our peopIe wilI change and a great danger will
threaten us. T h e present Cabinet, in view of this, is taking all
precautionary measures against this possibility. If we want 'to
urn the Koreans for the purposc of developjng our new mntinentnl
Empire, we must work out our measures for their defenw as carefully as possible. We must increase our police fon-e in North
Manchurra on the basis of the Mitsuin Agreement, in order to be
able to use this force in support of the K o r a ~ and
s to help them
to move forward rapidly. Totku Kaischa (the Society for the
Development of the East) and the South klancl~uriaRailway Company must also give th
financial nssistance. The Koreans must
be placed in specially a vantageous conditions in order that they
may develop the riches of Manchuria and Mongolia and monopr,lise dl rights of trade. The influx of Romans into these terri,torits is of such enormous economic and military importance, that
.the Imperial Government cannot fail to support it. I t opens up
new prospects for our Empire, Since the Wasl~ingtonConfere~rce
swept away all the advantages of the agreement cor~cludedbetween
Lansing and Ischi, our psition can be restoretl only by thc
presence in Manchu* of several millions of Koreans. As regards
international relations there can be no difficulties in this respect.

7

THE RAILWAYS AND ' T t l E IlEVEtOPLlENT OF OUR NEW CONT'WBNT.

Transport is the basis of national defence, the guarantee uf
The
success and the starting point of economic development.
Chinese railways extend over 7,aoo7,3w miles, 3,000 of which
are in Manchuria nnd Mongolia. Taking into consideration the

size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance uuf their
natural resources, we may say that more railroads are required
there, extending over no less than 5 , m to 6,om miles. It is a
great pity that aur railways are concentrated mainly in Southern

Manchuria and do not extend to the sources of wealth which arc
to be found in the northern part of the land. There are many
Chinese i n South Manchuria who are favoumbly indineti towards
our military and economic plans. If we wish to rfcvelop our
natural w d t h and strengthen our national defence, we must build
railways in North Manchuria. We can tben send more Japanese
to North Manchuria. From there we shail be able to strengthen
considerably our political and ecrrnomic development in South
Manchuria and strengthen our national defence in thc interests of
peace and order in the Far East. The South Manchurian RaRway w s built mainly for economic purprBses. There are no circahr railroads, which are so necessary for the ,mobilisat!m and
'trmsprt of troops.
From now onwar<ls we must pusue our
military aims and surround the heart of Manshuri'a. and Mangulia

with circular railways, in order, oa the one hand, to s n d tbe
military, political and economic development of China a d , on thic
other band, to hold back the penetration of Russian iinfueace.
This is the key to our continental policy.
- There are two main railways in Manchuria and Mongolia : the
As for the railCbinese-Eastern and the South Manchurian.
mad5 constructed by the Chinese, they wiU doubtless be of huge
importance now because of the financial support of the Kirh Provincial Government. Based upon the combined resources of the
Fengtiea Govei-nment and the Heilunkiang province, the Chinese
railways will considerably overtake our South Manchurian Railway in development and begin violent competition. Fortunately for
u s the financial situation in the Fengtien Government is extremely
disturbed, and without uur help the Chinese powers cannot put
matters to rights. Wc must make use of this. W e must take
positive steps and gain our ends in the matter of milway construction. If we are able to manipulate, the banknotes of the Fengtien
Government will k a m e entirety worthless ancl the province will
then bc unable, of course, to think of developing the Manchuria
and Mongolia. But we must remember the Chinese-Eastern Railway. It forms the letter "T" with the South Manchurian Railway. This system does not answer our military purposes, If we
look upon the S u t h Manchurian Railway as the main branch,
then the Chinese should build their railroads in the direction of
North to South, which would answer their requirements. Thus
our interests ought not therefore to come into conflict with the
Chinese. Now that Russia has lost all her influence and is not in
a position to penetrate into f i n c h r i a and Mongolia, the Chinese
must support us in our railmad construction. To our surprise,
however, the Fcngtien Government recently mnstructed two railways from Taguschin to TunIiao and from Kirin to Hainin for
exclusively military purposes. Tbese two railways are extremely
unfavourablc for our military plans in Manchuria and hlongolia
and to the interests of the Manchurian Railway. We mast,ener
getidly protested, therefore, against this construction work.
If in the end these railways were constructed, this is becausc
our representative, cquaBy with the representatives of the South
3lanchurian Railway, under-estimated the possibilities of the
Fmgtien Government. -%en we intervened, it was already too
late and the railway was finished. The Americans tried to invest
capital in Port Hulutao and to develop it with the help of I3riti.h
capitalists.
Thc Fengtien Government made use of this and
invested American and British capital in these raiIways in order
to deliver a blow at us. All we can do now is to await a suit&bIe
moment for opening up negatiations with China concerning them
two railways.

Of late r & ~ ~ ~have
r s been s p m d to the dect that the Fen*
Government intends running a road from Tagusehan to HarvIn

via Tunliao and Fu-Yu. This will be a direct l i e between Peking
and Narb'm, which will not touch either the South Manchurian or
the Chinese-Eastern Railways. More a s t d i n still is the facr
that they intend running another line from Muk en to Harbin via
Hailun, Kirin, Uchan. If this plan is carried out, these two lines
will surround the South Manchurian Railway and limit its sphere
of activity to the minimum. This will smash our pojitical and
economic development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the aim of
the Nine Powers Agreement will be reached, and our powers
limited. The completion of these two railways will make the South
Manchurian Railway entirely useless. T h e South Maodhurian
Railway Cwnpany will find itself face to face with a real crisis.
However, in the existing fimncbl conditions China cannot canstruct these two lines farther north than the South Manchurian
line. This should put us somewhat at ease. But if these two lines
are built and the Cbinese Government fixes cheap rates in order
to compete with the South Manchurian line, tben not only we, but
the CRineseEastern Railway as well will sustain a loss. Japan
and Russia, of course, will trot permit China to put through these
measures of obstruction, the more so since the ChineeEastern
Railway is largely dependent upon freight despatched frwn
Tsitsikar and Harbin.
The South Manchurian Railway does not answer out purposes.
Taking into consideration our present requirements and our activities in the future, we must have control over the railways bath in
North and South Manchuria The number of Chinese grm so
rapidly in South Manchuria that our politiml and economic
interests sustain losses. We are campelled in tbe circurnmces
to take aggressive measures in North Manchuria in order to safep a r d our prosperity in the future. But if the Chinese-Eastern
Railway, belonging to Soviet Russia, devclops in this district,
then our new continental policy will w i v e a blow which will
inevitably bring about conflict with Soviet Russia in the near
future. In this case we shall again be obliged to play the r8lc
we phyed in the RussJapanese war, The Chinese-Eastern Railway will become ours just as the South Manchurian Railway
became ours, and we shall seize Ririn as we seized Dairea. It
seems that the inevitabidity of crossing swords with Russia on the
Adds of Mongolia in order to gain passession of the wealth of
North Manchuria is part of our programme of national development. Until these Ridden rocks are blown up, our vessel cannot
move rapidly ahead. W e must demand from China the right to
build important military railways.
Wfien these railways are
finished, wc can fill North Man~huria to overflowing with
our forces. Soviet Russia will have to interfere and ibis wilI be
our pretext for open conflict.
W e must insist on ihe construction of the fallowing railways :(r) Tunlia+Sheches Railway. This will extend over 447 miles

d:

and h e cost of constructian will be. SO million yen* Wbe31 it is
completed it will be enormously useful in our struggle to devebp
Inner Mongolia. This, incidentally, is the most important trailway line for us. Careful investigations by the W m M&trp
have shown that there are enormous stretches of land in Inner
Mongolia suitable for the cultivation of rice. Witb this ldistriCt
properly developed, no fewer than 20 million of our Japanese papIation can live there. -4s many as two million head of cattle
bc bred there, which we a n use both for food and for e x p m to
Europe and America. Finally, there is the woof. The Mongolian
sheep give three times as much wool as the Japanese. The South
Manchurian Railway Company has made several experiments b
prove this fact. The Mongolian wool is far better than Australian.
Thanks to their cheap highquality wool which they have in
enormous quantities, Mongalia i s a potential source of enormous
wealth. If wc support this industry by deveIoping the railways,
the output will increase ten times a t least. W e are hiding this
fact from the rest of the world
that England and America may
not begin to compete with us. W e must therefore as a first step
get control of the tmnsport and then begin to develop the woollen
industry. If other countries get to hear of this in advance we
may find it i s too late. With the railways st our disposal, we em
develop the wo~llenindustry not only for our awn requirements,
but for export to Europe and America.
We shall Ire able to
achieve our plans for the possession of Mongolia. This railway
is a vital question for our policy in Mongolia. Without it Japan
csmnat play any r81e in Mongolian development.
(a) The Solun-Taonan Railway. This line will extend over 136
miles and will cost 10 million yen. If we look into the future of
Japan we have to admit the inevitability of war with Russia on
the fields of North Manchuria. From the military point of view
this railway will nor only allow us to threaten Russia from the
rear, but will deprive Russia of the possibility of bringing up
reinforcements into North Mongolia. From the economic point
of view this road makes it possible for us to exploit the rich
rwurces of the Tao-Erho valley and strengthen tbe p i t i o n of
the South Manchurian Pne.
The princes of the surrounding
districts, who are friendly disposed towards us, will be able to
use this line to increase aur infludce and open up their territories
to us. Our chances of co-oprating with the Mongolian princes,
obtaining land, mines and pasture-lands, and opening up h d e
with the native population, which is essential to our fnrther
penetration into the land, dl depend upon this railroad. m a ,
together with the Tunliaa-Sheches Raitway, will mean two r d roads leading into Mongolia. When industry is fully developed
we shalI be abIe to spread our influence throughout Outer
Mongolia. This lime is dangerous, however, in that it can faciliitate the migration of tbe Chinese into this new distrid and &us
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harm our policy. Remember the South M a n e h u h Railway.
Does it not serve the interests of China? An important pint is
that the land and the mineral depcsits lying in the neighbourhd
of the railway belong to Mongolian princes. If we obtain possession of these lands and mines there will be no need to fear Chinese
immigration. We can even compel the princes to pass Iaws
prohibiting Chinese immigration. If life becomes d i h l t for the
Chinese, they will of course leave the place. There are other
methods as well, by means of which it would be possible to
prevent the Chinese from inhabiting these places.
If we are
suficiently energetic, no sign of the Chinese will bc .left on
Mongolian territory.
(3) The Chanchun-Tnonan section. As this railroad goes from
Chanchun ta Fuyu and Dafai, the line between Chanchun and
'Faonan will extend over 131 miles and cost approximately r r
miltion yen. This line is of enormous economic irnportrmce, for
the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia is concentrated in North
Manchuria. We shall obtain access to North Manchuria ornd help
the South Manchurian Railway, thus aiming a blow at East China.
The railroad pass- through the valley of the River Sungari, where
the soil is extremely fertile and there is an abundance of agricultural products. h'ear to DaIai ore the YueIian watetfalls which
can be used fur electrical energy. It is clear that this section of
the milway will become a flourishing centre of industry and agriculture. Having built this line we can convert Dalai into a base
for our advance upon Siberia along three roads: via Taonan.
Anchai~and Tsitsikar. The wealth of North Manchuria will fall
into our hands, This line will help us to advance to Heilunkiang
as well. Together with thc road between Chanchua and Taonan,
this will farm n circular line which will be of strategical import:in= in our aim to penetrate into Mongolia. The population here
is very sparse, but the land is rich. For a period of fifty years
there will be no need to use fertitiscrs. Having possession of
this road we can control ali the riches of North Manchuria and
Mongolia.
Here another 30 million people at least ean live.
When tbe Dunchuask m d is cwmpleted and joined up with thc
line running from Hoiren to Korea, all products can be transported
direct to Osaka and Tokio. I n case of war, we should be able
to sent1 our troops into ~ortti'Manchuria and Mongolia through
the Sea of Japan direct, which would give the Chinese mops nu
chance of penctraiing into North Manchuria. Neither American
nor Russian boats can pass through the Korean Straits. As soon
as the roads between Kirin and Hoinen and Chonchun and Dalai
are compIeted, we shall be independent in the sphere of provisions
and raw materials. I n case of war no country can interfere with
us. Therefore, when negotiations begin about Manchuria and
Mongolia, China will have to submit and agree to our demands,
1f we want to put an end to the political existence of Manchuria

and bfongdii, in accordance with the third phase of the plan of
Emperor Medji, we must complete these two railways. ChanchunDalai Railway will coasiderably t 4 s e the value of the South

Manchurian Railway md will itself be a paying conam. This is
in our effort to penetrate into this
t errirory,
(4) Kirin-Hoiren line. Although the Kirin-Dunchwk line is
already complete, the Dunchuask-Hoiren line bas yet to be constructed. The narrow zft. Bin. gauge which we h m between
Hoiren and Laod-Goigoi is of nu use for the economic development
oftire new continent. Eight million yet must be spent to bmden
the gauge in this part of the line and ro million yen on the construction of the Laod-Goigoi Hunhua line.
TI& will cost
approximately ao million yen. When this is done we shall achieve
success in our continental policy. Up to now, persons tmvetlig
to Europe have been ~mmpelledto travel either through Ddren
or Vladivostock. Mow they can travel direct from Tsen-Tsin over
the Siberian Railway. When this enormous transprt system is
in our hands, we shall have no need to hide our intentions in
.Manchuria and Mongolia, which form the third phase of the Medji
pians. The Yamato race will then go forward to mnquer the
world. According to the legacy of Medji, our first step was tn
conquer Formosa and the second to annex Korea. Now the third
step must be taken which consists in the conquest of Manchuria,
Mongolia and China. When this has been done, a11 the rest of
Asia, including the islands of the South Seas will lie at our feet.
The fact that these tasks have not yet been fulAl1ed i s a crime on
the part of your servants.
The pcnple living in Kirin, Fengtien and a part of Heilunkiang
are called in histofy thc Suchans. The Suchans are scattered
along the sea coast and the valleys af the Amur and Tiumen rivers,
During various historical epuchs they were referred to as
Kulnyams, Suchons, Guebeys, Pals, Vots, Fuyus, Kendans,
Bokhnys, Nushens. They are n mixed race. The fordathers of
the Manchurian dynasty were b r n hem A t first they possessed
Kirin and thcn established their power in China for 300 years.
I f wc wish to pursue our continental policy, we must =Ice &s
historicnl fact into consideration and first of all settle in this
district.
Hence tlte necessity for building the Kirin-Hoiren
Railway.
The decision ns to whether this road should finish in Tsm-Tsin
or Lochin, or even Sunitsi, will depcnd upon circumstances. From
the point of vim of national defence, Lachin is the ideal harbour
and the ideal terminus. It is possible that this will be the best
harbour in theworld. On the one hand it will ruin Vlrdivostock
nnd on the other hand it will be the centre of the r i d e s of
Manchuria and Mongolia, D a i m is not yet our territory, and
while Alanchurin i s still nat part of our Empire, it wiJI be difficult
a most important beginning
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dwelop this town. As a result we should be in a difficult
position in case of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsusirna
and Senshina Straits and we should be cut off from Mauchuria
and MungoEa. Having lost our resources, we should be conquered,
the more so since England and America bave been working jointly
to cut down our power in these ctistricts. One day we s b d have
to fight against America to defend ourselves and to be a warning
to China as wdl. The American Asiatic Fleet whose base is jn
the Philippine Islands, wodd be near to Tsusima and S e n l k a .
If they were to send submarines to these places we shouId be
completely cut off from our Manchurian and Mongolian sources
of provisions and tslw materials, But if the Kirin-Hoiren Railway
wcrc completed, we should have a big circular line around the
whole of Manchuria and Korea and a small line in North
Manchuria. W e would bave complete freedom of movement in
all directions and could send our soldiers and the necessary s u p
plies in all directions. If we were able to supply all necessary
materials to our pow in Tsuruga and Nigata, with the help of
this railway line, the submarines of the enemy would not be able
to enter the Japanese and Korean Straits. In this case nobody
could interfere with us and the Japanese Sea would be the centre
d our national defence.
Having safeguarded the transport of provisions and raw
materials, we would have nothing to fear from the American
fleet or the Chinese or Russian armies. W e could put dawn the
Korean movement. I repeat, if we want to pursue our new continental policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia
are Eastern countries svhich are nbsolutefy undeveloped. S-er
or later we shall have to fight against Soviet Russia. The fight
will takc place in Kirin.
In order to take the third step of the Medji plan as regards
China, we must act as follows :I . W e must mobiiiso tho army divisions in Fukuoka and
Hiroshima and despatch them into South Manchuria through
Korea. Thus we shall prevent the movement of Chinese soldiers
to the North.
a. We shall send the army divisions at present in Nagoia and
Huansi by sea to Tsin-Tsin, and from there to North Manchuria
by the Girin-Hoiren Iine.
3. The Kwantun army will be despatched through Nigata and
Chuchii or Login, and from there by the Kirin-Hoim road to
North Manchuria
4. The army divisions a t present in Hokaido and SendJ must
be despatched by sea from Aornori and Hokodato to Vladivostock,
and from there by the Siberian railway to Harbin. They will
stop at Fintuan, seize Mongolia and prevent the Russians from
moving south.
5. A11 these divisions will form two large armies. In the
to

south they will m u p y Shanghaihuang md defend it from the
northward march of the Chinese troo~s. In ?he north they will
defend Tsitsikar from the movement i f Russian troops inio tbe
south. Thus all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia will
fall into our hands. Even if the war continues for ten years,
we shall have no fear of being left without supplies and armaments.
Let us see how far the Gin-Hoiren road is from our ports.
Taking Tsin-Tsin as the starting point, from there to Vladivostock
w o l d be 130 miles, to Tsuruga 475 miles, to M d j i 5m miles,
Magaski 650 miles, Fusan 5m miles.
Take Port Tsuruga as the starting p&t. In tbis case we muat
take Osaka into consideration as the industrial centre.
I.
Fmm Chanchun to Osaka is 406 miles by laad via Login
and 475 miles by sea. The journey takes gx h o w
h and Kobe, then
a. If the journey is made through D
Chanchun is 535 miles from Osaka by land and 8p1miles by sea.
The journey takes gz hours.
If Tsuruga is the point of departure instead of Dairen, an
ecanomy of 41 hours is mada If we reckon 30 miles an hour by
land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can curtail the length of
the journey by one half, using the best ships and fast trains.
Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgiurns of the Far East.
During the Great War, Belgium was converted into a httlaeld.
In our wars with Russia and the United States we must make
Manchuria and Mungolia bear all the horrors of war. As it is
obvious that wc shall have to violate the neutrality of these territories, it is essential that we build the Kirin-Hoiren and ChaadunDalai railways, as they are necessary for our military prepadous.
In case of war we can then easily increase our militzuy forces,
and in peace time we can transport thousands of people into this
district and cultivate rice there. This railway line, therefore, g i ~ w
us the opportunity of economic development m d of conquests with
the help of armed forces.
The construction of the Kirin-Hoirehilway must be completed
during the dry weather. The road has to pass through granite
mountains. In order to make the tunnels the most u-te
machines must be used. There is plenty of sand, bricks, clay and
so on in this district, so we shall feel no shortage in this respect
in building the road. Only rails, trucks and locomotives .will have
to be brought up. Far this reason it will be possible to lower
the cost of construction by at least 30 per cent. and finish the
work in half the usual time required.
Careful investigations Rave been made by our General Staff
Headquarters in the South Manchurian Railway Company, whicb
show that in those districts lying along the railway, there are n w
million tans of timber. If we fell one million tons annually for
impart into our country, we can do tbis for a period of o w years.
We shall then not require Arnerimn- timber, which costs us 80

million yen annually. W e cannot speak of this openly,
for if China and Russia hear that we receive so much timber from
Manchuria, they will want to compete with us and will tbernselves
take over the construction of this line. Moreover, the United
States might purchase the right to exploit this timber from the
Fengtien Government. America could then kill our paper industry.
Kirin was called the "ocean of trees" even during the reign of
Emperor Tsiaa-Lunia. Since then ncw trees have been planted.
I t would be difficult to imagine the wealth of these forests. In
order tn transport thii timber from Kirin to Osaka through
Chanehun and Dairen, a distance of 385 miles has to be covered.
W e have to pay 34 cents for eacb cubic foot of timber. In view
of the expensive cost of transport, we cannot compete with
America. However, if the Kirin-Hoiren railway is constructed,
this distance can be curtailer1 by 700 miles.
We could then
despatch our timber by sea to Osaka at the cost of only 13 cents
per cubic foot.
W e should then, of course, dispIace America
entirely. If we reckon that one ton of timkr gives a profit of
5 yen, then two milliard tons of timber would make it possible for
us, thanks to the railway, to easily make a profit of one milliard
yen. We should prohibit the import of American timber to Japan.
Moreover, thanks to the reduction in the pricw of timber, we shoulrl
be able to make another ao million yen a year through our fumiture, paper, industries, etc.
There an: the coal-mines of Sinchin as well, with 600 million
tons of coal. I n quality it is higher than the Fmhun coal, it is
easily obtained and from it kerosene can be produced, which we
could use ourselvcs or sell to China. The Kirin-Hoiren Railway
would bring us several other advantages without the slightest
difficulty. The mnl would be an addition to that of the Fusbun
mines. With both these coalf~ddsin our bands, we should have
the key to the industries of China, We could make 5 yen a ton
on the transport of Sinchi coal to Japan. This profit would riw
to 16 yen, if we use dI t chemical by-products from this mat.
If we reckon an average of 15 yen profit on one ton, we should
obtain on an average 200 milliard yen profit. All this wa should
obitlin exclusively as a result of rhe Kirin-Hoiren Railway.
Further, there are the goldfields alang the River Mutan, As a w n
as the Kirin-Hoiren Railway begins to work, the Swth Manchurian
Railway Company wi1I be able to make use of the rights it has
gained in connection with the goidfields in Tsepigoy and tbe Kirin
industrial nnd timber resources. A huge quantity of.agrieultura1
~~~~~~ats, wheat and so onbe had near to Dunhua,
Them are also to be found ao wine distilling works, 30 factories
working up vegetable oils and so on. All this can be ours if we
build the railway. Along the railroad trade can be carried on
with an annual turnover of 4 minion yen. The transport of agricultural protlucts alone will not only cover all the exploitation
to 109
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but will give a net profit of 200,yen a year.
into consideration the pmfits to be &ad
by tho
timber, coal and by-products, we should obtain t
h
#,@
million yen annually. Besides this, our position an the Mach*
W w a p would be consolidated ; we should acquire rights k
aection with timber, miand sa on and a huge number d
Japanese would be migrated into Nortb Manchuria, As a 6rst
step it is important to curtail the distance between J a w and the
swrces of wealth in North Manchuria. I t will take d j three
hours to reu& Hailin from Tsin-Tsin. Three bours would be
required to travel from H a i m to Sanfin and three hours more
tb cover the distance between the river Timinula and Luntsinbm.
In 60 hours we could reach the rich resources of North Manchu&.
TI& road alone will make it possible for us to seize the emmmus
riches d Nartb Manchuria.
q. Huncbun-Hailin railroad. The road will cover 173 mila,
and cost a4 million yen to construct. Along this line there we
dense forest lands. This road is essential i f we are to s h n g t b m
the Kirin-Hoiren road and exploit the t i m k r and mines of North
Manchuria. It is essential if we are to convert Hoiten into a
flourishing centre at the expense of Vladivostock. To the south
of Hoiren and to the north of Dunhua there is the Chintso Lake,
w G h can be used for electrical energy. With this supply of
energy at our disposal, we ean gain control of the agricdturaf
and industrial undertakings of Manchuria and Momia. The
investigations of the South Manchurian Railway Company show
that the lake can give at least 8a0,om horse-pww. With thh
mass of e l d e a l energy we can easily conquer the industries of
Manchuria and Mongolia Rich resourns will be available nwar
to this enormous power centre, which will increase with $henomend rapidity. W e must quickly build this railway to facilitate
the bansport. The Sin-kai lake is in the pos%ssionof China and
Russia, and can also be used for purposes of elmtrial energy.
In order that thew two muntries leave our p h s untouched, we
must pass a resolution at the international Electr+Cooferenr#
which will take place in T o k i ~tbis y k to the effect tbat in nu
district should there be more than one power s t a h . The paper
fhctory--Odju--has also obtained considerable rights in connection with timber near Nigata and Hailin. This factory requires
that a power station be ~wstructedimmediately on Lake Chiap,
and the Hunchun-HaiIin Railway l
x constructed as quickly as
possible, for then it would be possible with great rapidity to
transport raw materials growing wild in Mongolia.
If tbe Fen-Hi&-Uchan Railway Company and the Kirin authodties intend building the Uchan and Kirin-Mukdun Railway, with
Hulutao and Tientsia as ports, this is because tbey wish w gain
possession of the riches of Nortb Manchuria, Havh b d t the
Huncbun-HaUin Railway we should not only it&
Kirkr;osts,
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Hoirea, but would smash the Chinese plans and direct the flow of
Manchurian riches ta Part Tsin-Tsin. The cost of transport
would be one-third of the cast on the Chinese Railway and onehalf of the Siberian. They would be incapable of competing
against us, add the victory would be ours.
The total trade turnover in Manchuria is 7 to 8 milliard yen
annuany, and all: this trade would be in our hands. Our trade in
wool, cotton, soya beans, iron, amounts to one-twentieth of the
world trade. Our trade is continudly increasing. However, the
wealthiest street in Dairen is in the hands of the Chinese. And
this is not all. me production of vegetable oil is the main b-ch
of industry in Manchuria. Our share of this industry is only 6
per cent. Out of 38 factories in the vegetable oil industry in
Inkow, there is not one Japanese. Out of 20 factories in Andun
only one i s Japanese, and out of 82 or 83 in Dairen only seven are
Japanese. This is a great pity. la order to gain our lost positions,
we must first of nU develop the transport. Having gained controI
of tbe monopoly of finished products and raw materials, we l o u l d
occupy a dominating position in this industry. Moreover, we
must help the Japanese, engaged in this industry, by granting
them large credits and thus displace the Chinese. In Osaka there
are many Chmcsc trading our manufactud goods in M-lia
and Manchuria. They put up a strong competition against.tbn
Japanese living in -China. I t is more difficult for the Japanese,
since their standard of l i v i n ~is higher and they requirc a bigher
rate of pmfit. OP the other hand the Chinese dso have tbeir
weak pints. They obtain goods of eta inferior quality and, on
the other hand, they have to pay at Ieast ro per cent. more &an
the Japanese. They have to pay 2.70 yen more than the Japanme
for ebry ton of goods, but in spite a£ this they successfully cornpete against our merchants in Manchuria, This speaks clearly
enough of the incompetence of our people, The mere thought
of this is horrifying. Tbe Chinese is hdt entirely to bimself and
is given no help by the Government. The Japanese, Living in
Manchuria, is protected by his own Government and afforded 1%term credits at an insignificant rate of interest. W e should thew
fore organise an export ccwperative society for trade witb China.
I t should have specid facilities on steamers and on the South
Manchurian Railway, and the Huandun Government should afford
it credits at a low rate of interest. W e shall then be able to
compete successfully with the Chinese merchants, develop our own
industry in Manchuria and export our goods to alI parts of the
world.
I
The first step towards gaining control, financia1 and mercantile,
in Manchuria and Mongolia mnsistg in obtaining the monopoly of
the sale of the products of these countries. W e must have ttie
monopoly rights on the sale of Mongolian and Manchurian p m
ducts, b a u s e 0 ~ 1 yin this case shall we be able to p s u e oui

t

continend &, v e n t the penetration of Amerieaa capital a d
undermine the inftmce of the Chinese m
&
Although Manchurian a d Moqoliian goah must pam tb
three ports-Daim, I d m i and M ~ e v e r t h d s s hDaben
i
IS
most important is the given m e . There is an a n n d trafffc of
7 , V ~ ~ through
S
tbQ port witb r -1
of I I,*$T h s amount^ to p per ant of the total Mmchurb md
Mongolian t d e . From this port Meen diffemmt steamship linm
diverge. T h e majority of these h%
seme
s
the ooasa &wing.
W e control ail the tmnspwt system of Wmchutia aad Mo-k
We may even obtain the monopoly of the srrle of s p d d
Manchurian p~~
In tbis case tffe about6 be able to develop
our m m a W s p o r t and force the N i M and Ma pwts into
the background We should mntd the trade d mmmms qti* of kam, widely consumed in Central and South G h h . Tht
Chin- use vegetable oil in their f a d , and in
of war we
a u l d cut fbm IS fmm their supply of ofi and thy WUM suffer
cmsidembly. With the control d their source d fo&W&
z t h e vansp~nwe muld develop our ow preductio. of Aa,
iacrease the amopnt of fertilisers obtahd in the fwm d byproduets from Fu&m 6 Thus all the agricultum of C h h
w d d be dependent upm us. In caae of war we &odd plaee an
e g a upw futiltsers snd prohibit their import to & r i d rrnd
South China
This muld considumbly 4 the output of
EoodstwEs by ChW e ahodd not forget this side of the q u e
in buitdhg up our continental Empire. Neither &odd we
forget that Ewqw at~dA m 6 dso need enormaus gueplias of
beans fot the purpase of f e d i s a h . When we h o m e the
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~ o p a 1 ' ~ o f t h ~ p r o d ~ ~ ~ ~ Z b e ~ b o
lami and dn sea, thm mumries requiring Q e specid p d u c t s of
Rdaachutia md Mcmgofia d
l seek ow #avow. Wa must gain
C order ho. obtain
control of the wbo1e syir~ua,of
m a m p d y of tmde in him&& and M m g d h Oaly than aan
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we suppmss the Cbinm merchant
~ a w e v s r ,the ~ h ~ e are
s e ~earniag
our exampIt
bitting our trade w k l ~their own metWe have not
1-4
b compete 9uccewhliy e n s t them in rhe
a b v ~ t a b l e d s a a d i a t h c s p h a r e o f ~ ~
ship)).Having built up a new system of t r m m , we d d be
M e te pursue a doubleedged policy. On the one h a d we abwId
dndcavw1c M rn thaZ the Japanese Earn from the ergexZaree of
thChmecreiathisbusine~is. AtthesametimeweshtiddPotallow

fiom

*

the C

W to learn

industrid d&.
PrdoWy we W

( ~ f f

& c b r i ~in M d u r i a and Mongolia near to the so-

I

,-

of

raw

mat&&
Tbs Chinese were: thus d v e a tbe oppwtdtq. of &%~ r h g a u t s ~ a a d ~ ~ r o w a f a d e s w h c h m m p e i d with .ow o m . We must therefme sead our raw mate&&
to Japm aad work them up there, &&I
ewporting td#m .tra
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China and other countries in the form of manufactured e s .
W e should thus give work to our own unemployed, hold back the
influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and deprive the
Chinese of the chance ofcopying our new industrial methods The
iron obtained in f ensih and Anshaw, as well as the Fushua d
would also be sent to China for final working up.
W this speaks of the necessity of developing our ocean transport. W e must extend the Dairen Company "Kizen ah"
and our Government must atrord it a loan through the South
Manchurian Railway Company, at a high rate of interest. Nw$
year wc shall recave 50,tonnage for our wean r
t
a
n
s
m
This is quite sufficient to enable us to occupy a dominating position
in trade with the Far East. O n the one hand we have the South
Mmchuriaa R Jlway which guarantees our transport on the Iand,
and on the other hand we h v e the control of an enonnous amount
o€ Manchurian and Mongolian products waiting for transport.
The iron laws of emnomics guarantee us success if we extend o u r
ocean transport from Dairen as the central port.
THIB GOLD STANDARD IS ESSEMTlM..

In spite of the fact that Manchuria and Mongolia are within the
sphere of our activities, the main currency there is silver, This
brings a b u t a partial contradiction with our gold standard and
reacts unfavourably upon our interests.
If Japanese living in
these regions have not become wealthy, it is exdusively because
the silver money system is in operation there. The Chinese
stubbornly maintain the silver standard and we minot, therefore,
establish our plans for colonisation on a firm Bcorromic basis. We
sustailr Iosses as follow as a result ;1.
W e carry money Into Manchuria, based on the gold standard. Them we have to exchange it for Chinese saver dollars.
T h e exchange rate of the dollar frequently fluctuates as much as
20 per cent, causing heavy losses to our people living in
Manchuria, Speculation is a common occupation and the investment d capital becoma a sort of gama
If a person invests
200,oao yen in business, he may discuver one h e day that his
mpital has f a k n to r&,ooo or xso,ooo dollars (Chinese) as a
result of the fall in the exchange rate of the silver money. Consequently we bave s e v d
of bankruptcy.
a. The Chinese merchant makes use exclusivdy of silver
mwey, and therefore suffers no losses from the fluctuations in the
exchange rare. AIthougb the Chinese have no exact idea of the
exchange value of gold and silver, they always win k aU forms
of business. This is a natural gift of theirs, and we suffer &om
it. We suffer losses although we are supported by the banks.
As a result of the imperfect money system, the population of
Central and South China buy their beans excIusively from the
Cbincse. Here w e can do notbing, and must therefore conquer
the whde of China.

-

Manchuria and Mongolia according to our awn pIaas. W e would
thus allay international suspicions, clear the m d for broader p b
and compel the Powers to recognise the fact of our special position
in this country. W e should welcome aU do& on the part of the
Powers to invest their apital, but we must not d o w China to
do business with the large Powers as it would like to do. Smce
we wish the Powers to reoagnise our special position in Manchuria
and Mongolia both in the political and economic sense, we s h d
be compelled to interfere and to carry all the weight of responsibility, together with C h . W e must endearnut to ensure that
our policy expands to take in also the diplomatic relations of
China witb other countries.
THE NBIBI) TO MODfPY THE ORGANISATION OF THE SOUTH
WCUURIILN R m W A Y .

-

The South Mmchuriau Railway Company functions ia
Manchuria like the Korean Governor-GeaemI in the face of mations, If we want to build our new continental Empire, we shwld
change the whole organisation of the company and remove the
cliffidties with which we haw to fight, The functions of the
company are many-sided. Every &age in the Cabinet causes
chauges in tbe administration of the South Man&+sn Railway
and on the other hand the activities of the railway influence the
Cabinet to a considerable extent. The point is that the South
Manchurian Railway is semi- governmental. The Powers therefore consider this railway more in the nature of a political organ
than a commercial enterprise. As soon as measures are hkm
for the dwelapment of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers turn
to the Nine Powers Agreement in order to smasb tbe plans of the
South Manchurian Railway. This has considerably banned our
interests.
The South Manchurian Railway is under four-fold
control : the contrd of the Huandun Governor, the Supreme Representative of the authorities in Dairen, the h e r d Consul in
Mukden and, finally, the Pt~sidentof the railway itself. These
four plenipotentiaries have to exchange opinions in Daircn before
the railway company can take any important steps. Although
their meebngs take place behind closed doon, nevertheless the
Chinese powers of the Three Eastern Provinces learn a great deal.
They do their utmost to prevent the Central Chinese authorities
from giving the necessary permimioa for the putting through of
new measures, and, m o w e r , Al the decisions of the milway
company have to receive the consent of the Ministry for Foreign
Mairs, the Ministry of Transport, the War Ministry, and the
Ministry of F i i c a If one of these four ministries refuses to
approve the decisions, then the r d w a y company is p e r l e s s to
act. Because of this, our present Premier, although he tacogniwa
his failures, nevertheless has taken upon himself the reqmdbilities of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Constquently we can mark
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asily kaep oar p h s in Manchuria a secret, and we a put them
tbmugh with despatch and determination. The !501lth Manchurian Railway therefore must be reorganiged. W underW
i
n
g
s belonging to the railway must be cr*lver€ed into
independent companies under the leadership of the South
Manchurian Railway. W e can then take decisive measures for
the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand,
we must make the proposition to the Chinese, Europeans and
Americans, that they invest their money in the South Manchurian
Railway on condition that the majority of the bands remain in
oktr bands. The control of the raiIway will then remain with us,
and we shall bt able with even greater energy to carry out our
imperial mission. In inviting other Powers to take part in the
development of the South Manchurian Railway, we shall deceive
the whole world. Having done this, we shall mow forward into
Manchuria and Mongolia, free ourselves from the limitations of
aht Nhe Powers Agreement and s-gtben
our d v i t i e s witb
the hdp of foreign capital.
The fuIlowing are large undertakings belonging to the South
M a n d a h Railway :t.
Ilaow A m STEEL.
Iron md steel are closely connected with our national development. Howwer, as a result of the la& of ore, we cannot d v e
this problem. Up to now we have been coaaplled to import
steel from the Yaagtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. The
rni a ~ g a t i o of
~ sour General Headquarters show, bowmu,
that there are rich deposits of iron in Manchuria and MWh d h g to the most modest accounts tberie are xo billion tons
of imn there. At first, when technique was not so highly
developed, tbe Anshan iron and steel work had an
loss of
3 millinn yen. later, when new methods were worked out, &is
W t became amaller. In 1ga6 it was equal to no more than
ISO,"O,
and a year lafer the works were giving a p d t of
8m,ooa yen. If the Martin furnace is overhauled, we shall make
a n n d y . The quality of the iron h m
no less than q millton
Pensih is exceltent. This iron together with the Onsban ore will
make us independent in the sphere of iron and steel supplies.
The deposits of iron in Manchuria and Mongolii are equal to
approximately I,milliun tons ;those of cod 2,s- million tons.
Tbia deposit of 4 is sufficientto supply the reg-ts
of the
deposits of iron om With these enormous supplies of iron and
cad in our hands, we shaU be completely independent for a period
nf at least seventy
Reckoning xm dollars p d t on m e ton
of r t a l , we rhall
able to make a profit of 35.million yen
on 350 million tuna of st&. W e shall ewnomise rao million yen,
whicb we pay annuollly for imported steef. We have suikieat
iron and st& fw our industry, we shall become the leading d
Power, and wiIl be able to conquer East and West. For

&
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purpose the metal works mwt be separated from tbe Swth
Manchurian Railway.
2.

Oa.

Another commodity of enormous importance of which we have
a deficit is kmsena. It is esssentid for the life of the nation.
Fortunately there are 5,milIim tons of raw oil h tbe d*
mines of Fushun from which 6 per cent. dined oil csn be obtained
both for automobiles and for steamships. At present Japan
imports ?-,ow tons of oit m u a l l y at a cost of 60 d h yen.
As the Fusbun mines have 50 billion tons of refined oil, w~ can, at
,the rate of 5 per cenL, obtain 250 miltion t m s d best ad, and if
we raise the percentage to g, then we can obtain 450 million tws.
W e can obtain an average of 350 million tons. W e mn obtain
an average of 350 maion twa Reckoning at the rate of 15 yen
per ton, the Fushuu oil wiU give us a,aso million yen. This will
be a great industrial redutton for us. Oil is the great factor
from the point of vim of national defence and national wealth.
Our army and fleet will be invincible fortresses if we have the iron
and oil of Mmcbh. Without doubt Manchuria and Mongdia
aue the heart of our Empire.

Am'cultarrd fdlisws. Ammonia d p h a t e and 0th- P ~ ~ d t r c t j ,
For the pduction of footstuffs, agricultural fertilisers are
Ammonia sulphate can be obtained from coal for
essential.
&emid fertiIisatiaa. The Fushun coal is particdarly rich in
this respect. At present we use 500,ooo tons of ammo 'a aulphate.
Half of this mount we work up in Japan, using the
shlan and
Fushun cod. The other half we have to '=port from abroad qt
the cost of 35 million yen m year. As our agriculture is gmwirg
and we intend developing out new Empire in Manchuria and
Mongolia, we shall require a miIlion tons of ammonia sdphate
annually during the next ten years, Fnwn the by-prodltcb
obtained by burning Fushun coal during the smelting of steel,

#,

we can obtain an e a ~ m o u samount of ammcmir sulphate, If we
work up 3m,000 tons annually, we s b d increase our annual
income by more than 90 million yen. This will 've a totsll of
*,ow million )en in the course of 8fty years.
ts money can
be used to raise our agricdture, and if there is a balance, we a n
buy fettilising manures and supply all the agricultural undertakings throughout China and the South Sea Islands. This businmust also be separated from the South Manchurian Railway,
and we shall then have complete contro1 over the fertilising
materials throughout the Far East.
We rue importing ~oo,oaotons of soda at a cost of over xo
million yen annually, Both soda and Yoda ash are essential for
military and industrial purpopes. Soda is obtained fmm d t and
cod, which are to be found in abundance in Manchuria and
MongoIia. If we take up this w k we shaU be able to satisfy
the requirements not only of Japan but will be able to d to

#
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Wna and obtain the monopoly of this branch d industry. W e
s b d d gain a pr&t of m less than r$ million yen annually. Tbk
s h a d also be removed from tlie control of the Soutb Manchurian

I

Railway*

d
I

MAGNBSXA AND ALUYIMIUM.

According to information of the South Manchurian W w a y
and the assertions of Dr. Hont from the Tohdru University, there
is an abundanw of aluminium and magnesia in Manchuria.
m e d a is to be found in the neighbourhd of Tasbicbaw,
rduminium dose h Enmi. Here are the largest deposits in the
world, A ton of magnesia costs z,ooo yen and aluminium 1,The tatal value of the deposits of these mine*
in Man&&
k
750 million yen. These minwds are &culady
useful for the
manufacture of aeroplanes, medical k.~timmts,ships, etc.
T b m are large d e p i t s oalp in the U d t d S@tes of America.
Thest metals are becoming more and mom enwtial everg day
and the supply is continually falling. The g r h rise rapidly,
The depdts on our territory in Manchuria and M a g d a are the
gift of G d They are essential for our industry and nations1
defence ; and this industry also must be made ihdependmt of the
South Manchurian Railway. The metals must be -Iced
up in
Japan in order that the Fengtien Government may not q y cnsr
methods, and also to ensure that British and A m e r b m mphd
haye no oppnrhmity of observing our p
m Ha
adzed
these deposits in tbe T h m Eastern Provinces, we
use
is
the watw-power of the River Yalu to work it up. As avl&
continually developing, the whole world would in the future a@y
to us for materials for aeroplane coastwction.
If all these u n d e r t a k i are independent of each other, they
wiU be able to progress rapidly and give us no less than h b i l l k
yen p d t annually. The industrial ddoprnmt of South
Manchuiia k of enormous importance for our national defence and
ecoaomic development. It will lay the fuundatioos of our industrial Empire, As for cultural institutions like hospitals, scbaoIa
and so on, they are the beralds of our progress in Manchuria and
Mongolia. They will raise our prestige and auWity. They
must be separated h m the South Mwcburiaa Railway in order
that they may double our p v e r in moving into North Mancburh.
When these big undertakings h o m e independat and fteed
ftom the intedemnce of our oBcials, they will of course become
centres of arttional pmsperity. W e shall rapidly move forward
on the wings of economic development, w i t b w t arousing tbe aspicions of ?he Powers and without d i n g forth anti-Jayacthidehi among the population of the Three Eaaterxl Pmmes.
W
l
t
h the help of these drcumspect methods, we can create o m
new continental Empire.
Farei loans afforged to the South Ma
& u d G tho% rdways alone which are
remaining railways built
us, but nomi

&%
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of China, may be mdgamattd with the frnished railways, or r?ap
be made independent, according to the desires of the investmg
Powers. The slogan of "equal cbances" will give us the opportunity of getting foreign lans and allaying all suspicion as regards
our intentions in N o d Manchuria. In any case, foreign capital
will be required by us for developing our continental Empire.
When the foreign Powers are given the opportunity of investing
their capital in the South Manchurian Railway, they will gladly
give us more money and China will be able to do nothing against
it, This is the best way of developing our plans in Mancburia.
We must lose no time, but must take up the same line with regard
to the riches mncentratecl in North Manchuria and Mongolia. We
must convert the new roads from Kitin to Hoiren and from Chanshun to Dalai into separate undertakings, as well as the t i m k
and mining undertakings.
The exploitation of North Manchuria will considerably enrich
the Manchurian Railway. W e must permit foreign Powers to
invest their money in the South Manchurian Railway and to receive
their t a r e d the profits. When they begin to receive pro&,
they will cease to hinder our activities in Manchuria. Enomoris
masses of Chinese are migrating into South Manchuria.. Their
The position of our
position will become stronger every day.
immigrants ir becoming gradually worse, since the right to rent
Imd is.not yet fully safeguarded inside the country. Even with
the support of our Government, they cannot campet with the
Cbinese, whose standard of living is lower. Our only chance i s
to beat the Chinese by investing considet.able sums of money. But
to do this, we need foreign loans. The wealth of North Manchuria must be joined up with our forces in South Manchuria,
and the problem will be immediately solved once and for dl. If
we fail in this task, they will be able to hold out in North Manrhuria and will provide us with foodstuffs and raw materials. As
the interests of Nortb Manchuria and Japan are closely connected,
we must immediately enter North Manchuria and pursue our policy
there.
WE MUST W R M A COLONIAL
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DEPARTMENT.

~ d not
d
P m d y , 1 consider that 2 the ab~rptionof
be c a m 4 out during the time when Ib held smy, it was h u s a
of
Jack Bf a, specid organ of mntral. As a rusult there was
t &&ereace of opinion and it was impossihk to pursue our
'This opened up the way for iatemathal obstmcs
tion and Rcrr-n oppodtion. Masses of propagandists arrived in
Gurdpe+ Axntarica and a r e a and dmhred that we rmgdse the
independence of Korea and have no cla~rnon her territory. Aa
a result it was possi'ble for us to retrieve international wnfidenct
ong w e . If we create a calanial &partmeat as though for
Formosa, we shall p i n our: ends. It is quite d&c that a special
iastitutirn ir required for the development of mloahrion and
'tmmigratioa. The creation of the new Empire irt Wagolia and
Manelm& is of enormous importaace for the existence of J a w ,
There must be a special colanial department in arder to control our
poIig wer this enormous territory direct from Tokio. Qur &ci&
there must m e d y accept our opders, but must not interfere
arb'hriiy in the puisuana of out paiicy. This will safeguard
tht proper s&creq is reserved and hostile nations will be unable
t~ dismver oiir secrets concerning Our colonial activides. I n k mtiond puMc opinion wilt not then ke,abIe to f&w our mevemats in Mongolia md Manchuria and we shall not have to farr
m

m
t Wcy.

their interference.
As ifoi our! undwakings bn the Soutb Manchurian R-y,
like the & l a p e n t : Society, the Land Society, the Trust Company, e t ~control
,
of these aedexbldn s h d d be in the hsq&
of the cotmiJ deprtment. They s h u all be under united con-
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trol for the purpose ul helping u l in the policy of e x p i o n in
Mongulk and Manchuria, wbich is being pursued by h e Imperial
Government, ant1 thus assist in the building up of the new Empire.
TWI VALLEY OF THE TAWW YlVER ON THE PBWMWDBN RAILWAY.

The valley of the TaIin Kiver is an enormous, sparsel popuThe place seethes with bandits. Many zirrans
have placed investments here, especially in the rice p l a n t a ~ r .
The district gives promise of becomlag a nourishing centre.
Furthermore, it is easy to move forward into the Sbechea district
from here. W e must do our utmost to defend our Koreans and
then use the first available opportunity of obtaining the r-aht to
colonist this district from China. Our immigrants must obtain
an opportunity of living here and playing as our vanguard h the
advance upon Shcches and Mongolia. In case of war this mlley
will be a strategical point for the large armies. W e &dl then
be able not only to prevent the Chinese from mwhg north, but
will rule over the enormous riches in South Manchuria. 11 the
Koreans come to this district we must offer them financial suppwt
through our trust mieties and other fmncial o r g a h o n s .
These organisations must have property rights, and the-Koreans
will be limited to the right to work upon the land. Formally,
however, the Koreans must have property rights. T h we tan
obtain these rights from the Chinese Government.
The trust
societies and financial organs must fully support our Korean sub
jects in their efforts to obtain land. If they need money to buy
bwl, the financial organs must help them. W e shall thus, unnoticed, gain the control of the best rite plantations which w r
immigrants, i.e., the Japanese, must receive. They will have to
(lisplace the Koreans who, in their turn, will seek new lands wbicb, '
in the future, will also come into the hands of our psoplc. This
is our policy in the work of mlonisin the rice and bean plantations.
As for cattle-breeding, the %evdopment Society must
reccive +a1
powers and phce hrge herds at ?he disposal of our
country, This society must engage in horse-breeding, choosing
the bmt Mongolian horses for the purpose of national dehnce b
Japan.
lated territory.

T W STRUGGLE AGAINST CAINBSB lMMIGRAl?m.

The internal contiicts in China have forced an enormous t w n k
of Chinese of late to settle down in Mongolia and8M u r i a .
This bas formed a great menace to our immigAonh We must
bere take the corresponding measures. The fact Yhat the -st
Government welooma this hmigmtion and a
measurer
against it, is a serious menace to our own i m r n i g t a h
d
known American specialist on China declared tbat the
owners are pursuing such a fine policy that everybody is settling
down on its territory. Thus the influx of immignmts is r#
as a sign of the energetic policy of the Mukden authorities. Thb
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